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Abstract
Ranges of differentiated abstention are shown to reverse an “ex-
act” poll estimate on voting day allowing the minority candidate to
win the election. In a two-candidate competition A and B with vot-
ing intentions at Ia, Ib = 1 − Ia and respective turnout at x and y,
there exists a critical value Iac for which Iac < Ia <
1
2 yields an actual
election outcome va >
1
2 . The reversal may occur without any change
of individual choices. Accordingly, for a set of turnouts x and y the
minimum voting intention Iac required for A to win the final vote can
be calculated. The various ranges of x and y for which IAc is smaller
than the expected 50% barrier are determined. The calculations are
applied to the coming 2017 French presidential election for a second
round scenario involving the National Front candidate Marine Le Pen
against either the Right candidate Franc¸ois Fillon or the Center can-
didate Emmanuel Macron. Several realistic conditions are found to
make Marine Le Pen win the election despite voting intentions about
only 40-45%.
Keywords: poll estimates, actual voting, turnout, abstention
French Presidential elections are characterized by a two-round voting
system. The first round of the 2017 election will be held on April 23 and the
second round on May 3. This upcoming election is of a very particular nature
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combining an unpredictable winner and a predictable loser. While Marie Le
Pen should take first place in the first round and thus qualify for the second
round, she is expected to be defeated in the second round, whoever her
challenger might be. The French presidential electoral system thus exhibits
paradoxical features pointing to a blatant non-democratic drawback which
ensures the candidate who comes second in the first round will come first in
the second round when a National Front candidate is present. Actual race
thus resumes to win the second place at the first round.
The expected Le Pen defeat in the second and final round is rooted in the
existence of a so called “Republican Front”, which has been activated regu-
larly with total success, besides very rare exceptions, each time a National
Front candidate has run in the second round of a local or national election.
The Republican Front results from the interplay of two effects. The first
effect stems from the refusal of all political parties, Right and Left, to join
forces with FN candidates for second round of local elections. The second
effect emerges from the adamant refusal of millions of voters to allow a Na-
tional Front candidate to be elected. In order to prevent this from happening
they vote massively to support the challenger candidate regardless of their
political affiliation. This creates what has been defined as a “glass ceiling”,
which prevents any National Front candidate who runs at the second round
from exceeding the required threshold of 50% of the ballot needed to win the
election. Although this Republican Front has eroded substantially over past
elections, it continues to maintain the glass ceiling positioned below 50%.
Therefore Marine Le Pen cannot win the second and final round however
high her score is since in all cases this score will be below 50%. In contrast,
the National Front did manage to get numerous candidates elected to the
European parliament since these elections are proportional [1].
Nevertheless, it is important to stress that the current campaign has been
rife with unexpected outcomes embedded with a series of ongoing judicial
incidents. Primaries were held successively by the Right-Center and latter
by the Left. The outcome of these primaries for both the Left and the Right-
Center was the defeat of the favorite candidate on both sides. On the Right
(Les Re´publicains) Alain Juppe´ was defeated by Franc¸ois Fillon and on the
Left, (the Socialist Party) Manuel Valls by Benoˆıt Hamon. As a result, the
possibility that the erosion of the Republican Front will accelerate suddenly
cannot be dismissed. Although very unlikely to happen, the existence of
such a possibility makes the likelihood that Marine Le Pen could be elected
shift from impossible to improbable [2].
While above conclusion results from the usual analysis of National Front
dynamics, in this paper I suggest a novel phenomenon which may well shake
2
drastically this existing situation. Indeed, certain ranges of differentiated
abstention in the second round of the elections are shown to reverse the
expected failure of Marine Le Pen into success without any change in indi-
vidual choices. On this basis, the likelihood of Marine Le Pen being elected
President of France in 2017 shifts from improbable to quite possible.
To substantiate my claim I develop a simple generic study which departs
from classical studies of abstention within political sciences [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8,
9]. More generally, I consider a two-candidate competition A and B with
“exact” voting intentions Ia and Ib = 1 − Ia. When Ia < Ib, i.e., Ia < 12 ,
some range of differentiated abstention is found to reverse the expected
voting order with actual vote outcome va >
1
2 for A and vb = 1 − va < 12 .
Indeed, given respective turnout x and y, there exists a critical value Iac for
which Iac < Ia <
1
2 yields va >
1
2 . The various ranges of x and y for which
Iac is smaller than the 50% barrier are determined.
At every election, once voting is completed, three quantities Va, Vb, T
are obtained, respectively ballots for A, ballots for B, and actual turnout.
We thus have Va+Vb+(1−T ) = 1 since (1−T ) measures actual abstention.
Blank and null ballots could be accounted for but without changing the
results. To simplify the presentation every voter is assumed to have made a
choice on voting day, which does not imply to cast a ballot. Usually, these
data are rescaled so that the winner is elected by more than 50% of the
ballots cast with
Va,b → va,b ≡ Va,b
Va + Vb
, (1)
with va + vb = 1. We thus have va, vb, T instead of Va, Vb, T making the
winner elected with v > 12 .
Respective turnout x and y for A and B correspond to differentiated
abstention (1− x) and (1− y) which yield actual turnout
T = xIa + yIb = (x− y)Ia + y. (2)
It should be stressed that only T is known while x and y are not. In addition,
from “exact” voting intentions Ia and Ib we obtain Va = xIa and Vb = yIb.
Eq. (1) thus writes
va,b =
xIa,b
xIa + yIb
. (3)
From Eq. (3) A wins the election when va > vb ⇔ xIa > yIb = y(1 − Ia),
which yields a critical value for voting intentions for A
Iac =
y
x + y
. (4)
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When Ia > Iac A wins the election with va > vb even if Ia <
1
2 . Therefore
knowing x, y and Ia allows to predict the outcome of the election. At the
critical voting intention Ia =ac the associated critical turnout value writes
Tc =
2xy
x + y
. (5)
In Figure (1) the critical line Iac =
y
x+y (red) is shown as a function of
0 ≤ y ≤ 1. In the Ia < Iac area (blue lower dark part under the curve) B
wins the election. In the Ia > Iac area (upper yellow clear part above the
curve) A wins the election. The arrow (red, right side) shows the A vote
at va = 0.5068 for y = 0.65 and Ia = 0.44 > Iac = 0.4333 allowing A to
win with an “exact” minority of voting intentions. The dot (red) locates
A voting intention at y = 0.65 for Ia = 0.44. The arrow (green, left side)
shows the A vote at va = 0.4857 for y = 0.60 and Ia = 0.40 < Iac = 0.4138
not allowing A to win with an “exact” minority of voting intentions. The
dot (green) locates A voting intention at Ia = 0.40 for y = 0.60.
Figure (2) shows the critical surface Iac =
y
x+y a function of 0 ≤ x ≤ 1
and 0 ≤ y ≤ 1. As an example, the intersection with the Ia = 0.42 (green)
plane is exhibited. Part of the plane below the Iac surface (at the back of
the graph) leads to a B victory while the part above (at the front) leads to
a A victory.
Another critical value can be determined for B turnout y with
yc =
xIa
1− Ia , (6)
leading to A being elected in the range y < yc for a set x and Ia. In such a
case va >
1
2 even if Ia <
1
2 .
However, given that x and y are not known, Eqs. (4) and (6) can only
be used to define ranges of differentiated turnouts which yield the A victory
as shown in Figures ( 1, 3, 4, 5). It is thus possible to signal when voting
intentions are located in turnout ranges for which an unexpected outcome
that contradicts poll predictions becomes feasible.
In Figure (3) the critical line yc =
xIa
1−Ia is shown as a function of 0 ≤
Ia ≤ 12 for x = 0.85. In the y < yc area (lower dark part under the curve)
A wins the election. In the y > yc area (upper clear part above the curve)
B wins the election. The arrow (blue, right side) shows the A vote at
va = 0.5002 for Ia = 0.45 and B turnout y = 0.695 allowing A to win with
an “exact” minority of voting intentions. The dot (red) locates B turnout
at y = 0.695 < yc = 0.7647 for Ia = 0.45. The arrow (green, left side)
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shows the A vote at va = 0.4491 for Ia = 0.40 and B turnout y = 0.695 not
allowing A to win with an “exact” minority of voting intentions. The dot
(green) locates B turnout at y = 0.695 > yc = 0.5667 for Ia = 0.45.
Figure (4) shows the variation of the critical curve yc =
xIa
1−Ia for x =
0.95, 0.90, 0.85, 0.80, 0.75 as a function of 0 ≤ Ia ≤ 12 . As an example, the
intersection with the y = 0.60 (green) plane is exhibited. Part of the plane
below the yc surface (at the back of the graph) leads to an A victory while
the part above (at the front) leads to a B victory.
Figure (5) is three-dimensional exhibiting the critical surface yc =
xIa
1−Ia
(red) as a function of 0 ≤ Ia ≤ 12 and 0 ≤ x ≤ 1. As an example, the
intersection with the y = 0.60 (green) plane is exhibited. Part of the plane
below the yc surface (at the back of the graph) leads to an A victory while
the part above (at the front) leads to a B victory.
To illustrate the reversal process driven by Eq. (6) I suggest three sce-
narios which available polls show to be plausible [10, 11]. Table (1) exhibits
these three scenarios from the perspective of critical A voting intentions Iac.
The first scenario shown has x = 0.90 and y = 0.65, which yields critical
A voting intentions Iac = 0.4194. Accordingly, an actual A voting inten-
tion Ia = 0.42 leads to an A victory with va = 0.5007 and actual turnout
T = 0.7550. The second scenario has x = 0.90 and y = 0.70, which yields
critical A voting intentions Iac = 0.4375. Accordingly, an actual A vot-
ing intention Ia = 0.44 leads to an A victory with va = 0.5025 and actual
turnout T = 0.7880. The final scenario considers x = 0.85 and y = 0.695,
which yields a critical A voting intention Iac = 0.4498. Accordingly, an
actual A voting intention Ia = 0.45 leads to an A victory with va = 0.5002
and actual turnout T = 0.7648. An additional case still with x = 0.85,
y = 0.695 and Iac = 0.4498 is given to show that an actual A voting in-
tention Ia = 0.43 < Iac = 0.4498 leads to A loosing with va = 0.4799 and
actual turnout T = 0.7617.
These three scenarios can be looked at from the perspective of critical
B turnout as shown in Table (2). The first scenario starts with x = 0.90
and actual A voting intentions Ia = 0.42 to yield a critical B turnout yc =
0.6517. Actual B turnout y = 0.65 < yc = 0.6517 gives an A victory with
va = 0.5007 and actual turnout T = 0.7550. The second reads x = 0.90
with actual A voting intentions Ia = 0.44. This yields a critical B turnout
yc = 0.7071. Therefore, actual B turnout y = 0.70 gives an A victory
with va = 0.5025 and actual turnout T = 0.7880. The final scenario has
x = 0.85 and actual A voting intentions Ia = 0.45 which yields a critical B
turnout yc = 0.6955. A turnout y = 0.695 lead to va = 0.5002 and actual
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A turnout x B turnout y Critical Iac Actual Ia Turnout T Actual va
0.90 0.65 0.4194 0.42 0.7550 0.5007
0.90 0.70 0.4375 0.44 0.7880 0.5025
0.85 0.695 0.4498 0.45 0.7648 0.5002
0.85 0.695 0.4498 0.43 0.7617 0.4799
Table 1: Three cases of A and B turnouts (x and y) are considered. For each
one the critical A voting intention Iac is calculated. Then, voting intentions
Ia > Iac <
1
2 are shown to yield a voting ballot va >
1
2 . Associated turnouts
are calculated. Last line shows a case for which the reversal does not occur.
A turnout x Actual Ia Critical yc Actual y Turnout T Actual va
0.90 0.42 0.6517 0.65 0.7550 0.5007
0.90 0.44 0.7071 0.70 0.7880 0.5025
0.85 0.45 0.6955 0.695 0.7648 0.5002
0.85 0.43 0.5667 0.695 0.7617 0.4799
Table 2: Identical three cases as in Table (1) using Eq. (6), i.e., A turnout x
and voting intention Ia are given. The corresponding critical B turnouts yc
are calculated. For several actual B turnouts y < yc, T and va are calculated.
Last line shows a case for which the reversal does not occur.
turnout T = 0.7648. A fourth scenario still with x = 0.85 but with actual
A voting intentions Ia = 0.43 is given. The critical B turnout is yc = 0.5667
making y = 0.695 > yc = 0.5667 not allowing the reversal with A loosing at
va = 0.4799 and actual turnout T = 0.7617.
At this stage, before applying above results to the upcoming 2017 French
presidential election, it is worth to notice that during the public campaign
which takes place before an election, each candidate tries to gain a maxi-
mum number of voting intentions. It produces a dynamics of public opinion
which drives an initial distribution of voting intentions toward a final dis-
tribution, which eventually determines the final outcome of the election.
Successive polls show how overall support for each candidate evolves during
the campaign period. Accordingly, if we consider poll estimates to be ex-
act, in principle a last day poll prior to the election should yield the voting
outcome.
However, such a statement was proven wrong with recent 2016 poll fail-
ures to predict in particular the Brexit and Donald Trump election. The
failure origin could trace back to either a technical drawback related to
sample composition and size, or to an unanticipated and sudden shift in
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individual choices on the very day of the vote. Indeed, it happens that I did
predict successfully these two poll breakdowns using my sociophysics model
of opinions dynamics [12].
For the Brexit I did warn against holding referendums about the Euro-
pean construction many years ago pointing to the likelihood of a rejection
despite earlier polls yielding large support to the vote in favor of it [13, 14].
Along this line I also predicted successfully the 2005 French referendum re-
jecting the project of European constitution [15]. Using the same model I
predicted a few months ahead of the vote the totally unexpected victory of
Donald Trump at the 2016 US presidential election [16]. I also forecast the
2002 Le Pen electoral breakthrough [17].
All these studies have enlightened the occurrence of non linear phenom-
ena with sudden and abrupt change of individuals choices, supporting the
second origin, i.e., sudden opinion shifts, for poll failures. Nevertheless, here
I have advocated a third reason, which is not connected to a dynamics of
choice shiftings, to turn wrong “exact” poll estimates. Differentiated ab-
stention, which does modify individual choices, but accounts for the making
of a voting intention into casting a ballot, was proven to boost a minority
candidate to first place the voting day.
However such a ranking shift requires the existence of a significant gap
in respective turnouts for the competing candidates. And it turns out that
the 2017 French presidential election will produce such a gap in respective
abstentions.
This fact stems from the actual growing reluctance from potential mem-
bers of the Republican Front to vote for either one of Marine Le Pen leading
challengers, Franc¸ois FIllon or Emmanuel Macron. The novelty is to have a
simultaneous double reluctance among many individuals, which will create
a kind of voting paralysis among committed anti-NF individuals ending into
a solid gap in respective abstentions.
This differentiation process is expected to be accentuated by the very fact
that most Marine Le Pen voters are people who want to vote for her while a
good deal of her challenger voters are people who want to oppose her. This
asymmetry will contribute in making abstention considerably higher for the
challenger than for Le Pen, making above cases with Ia <
1
2 and va >
1
2 very
plausible. For instance, 42% can lead to 50.07% as shown in Table (1). Such
an outcome is not because of a multi-level system as in the United States
but more prosaically because of the discriminated role that abstention will
play in the next presidential election.
To conclude, I have used a very simple analysis to show that differenti-
ated abstention can have a drastic effect on an election outcome. In particu-
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lar, when applied to the second round of upcoming 2017 French Presidential
election to be held on May 3, I have proved that for the first time in the
National Front history its candidate has a real chance of winning the race
to become the next French President despite voting intentions about only
40-45%.
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Figure 1: The critical line Iac =
y
x+y (lower line, red) is shown as a function
of 0 ≤ y ≤ 1 for x = 0.85. In the Ia < Iac area (blue lower dark part under
the curve) B wins the election. In the Ia > Iac area (upper yellow clear part
above the curve) A wins the election. The arrow (red, right side) shows the
A vote at va = 0.5068 for y = 0.65 and Ia = 0.44 > Iac = 0.4333 allowing A
to win with an “exact” minority of voting intentions. The dot (red) locates A
voting intention at y = 0.65 for Ia = 0.44. The arrow (green, left side) shows
the the A vote at va = 0.4857 for y = 0.60 and Ia = 0.40 < Iac = 0.4138 not
allowing A to win with an “exact” minority of voting intentions. The dot
(green) locates A voting intention at Ia = 0.40 for y = 0.60. The critical line
Tc =
2xy
x+y is also shown (upper line, blue dashed) as a function of 0 ≤ y ≤ 1
for x = 0.85.
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Figure 2: The critical surface Iac =
y
x+y is shown as a function of 0 ≤ x ≤ 1
and 0 ≤ y ≤ 1. As an example, the intersection with the Ia = 0.42 (green)
plane is exhibited. Part of the plane below the Iac surface (at the back of
the graph) leads to a B victory while the part above (at the front) leads to
a A victory.
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Figure 3: The critical line yc =
xIa
1−Ia is shown as a function of 0 ≤ Ia ≤ 12
for x = 0.90. In the y < yc area (lower dark part under the curve) A wins
the election. In the y > yc area (upper clear part above the curve) B wins
the election. The arrow (blue) shows the A vote at 0.5007 for Ia = 0.42 and
B turnout y = 0.65 allowing A to win with an “exact” minority of voting
intentions. The dot (red) locates B turnout y = 0.65 < yc = 0.6517 and
voting intentions Ia = 0.42. The arrow (green, left side) shows the A vote
at va = 0.4491 for Ia = 0.40 and B turnout y = 0.695 not allowing A to
win with an “exact” minority of voting intentions. The dot (green) locates
B turnout at y = 0.695 > yc = 0.5667 for Ia = 0.45.
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Figure 4: The critical line yc =
xIa
1−Ia is shown as a function of 0 ≤ Ia ≤ 12
from top down for x = 0.95, 0.90, 0.85, 0.80, 0.75. In the y < yc area (lower
dark part under the curve) A wins the election. In the y > yc area (upper
clear part above the curve) B wins the election.
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Figure 5: The critical surface yc =
xIa
1−Ia (red) is shown as a function of
0 ≤ Ia ≤ 12 and 0 ≤ x ≤ 1. Intersection with the y = 0.60 (green) plane is
exhibited. Part of the plane below the yc surface (at the back of the graph)
leads to an A victory while the part above (at the front) leads to a B victory.
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